With the proliferation of training data, distributed machine learning (DML) is becoming more competent for largescale learning tasks. However, privacy concern has to be attached prior importance in DML, since training data may contain sensitive information of users. Most existing privacyaware schemes are established based on an assumption that the users trust the server collecting their data, and are limited to provide the same privacy guarantee for the entire data sample. In this paper, we remove the trustworthy servers assumption, and propose a privacy-preserving ADMM-based DML framework that preserves heterogeneous privacy for users' data. The new challenging issue is to reduce the accumulation of privacy losses over ADMM iterations as much as possible. In the proposed privacy-aware DML framework, a local randomization approach, which is proved to be differentially private, is adopted to provide users with self-controlled privacy guarantee for the most sensitive information. Further, the ADMM algorithm is perturbed through a combined noise-adding method, which simultaneously preserves privacy for users' less sensitive information and strengthens the privacy protection of the most sensitive information. Also, we analyze the performance of the trained model according to its generalization error. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments using synthetic and real-world datasets to validate the theoretical results and evaluate the classification performance of the proposed framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I N the era of big data, distributed machine learning (DML) is increasingly applied in various areas of our daily lives, especially with proliferation of training data. Typical applications of DML include machine-aided prescription [1] , natural language processing [2] , recommender systems [3] , to name a few. Compared with traditional single-machine model, DML is more competent for large-scale learning tasks due to its scalability and robustness to faults. Alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM), as a commonly-used parallel computing approach in optimization community, is a simple but efficient algorithm for multiple servers to collaboratively solve large machine learning problems [4] , which we also use as the underlying algorithm in the DML framework.
However, privacy concern is a significant issue that has to be considered in DML. In many machine learning tasks, X. Wang, L. Du, P. Cheng and J. Chen users' data for training the prediction model contains sensitive information, such as genotypes, salaries, and political orientations. For example, if we adopt DML methods to predict HIV-1 infection [5] , the data used for protein-protein interactions identification mainly includes patients' information about their proteins, labels indicating whether they are HIV-1 infected or not, and other kinds of health data. Such information, especially the labels, is extremely sensitive for the patients. Moreover, there exist potential risks of privacy disclosure. On one hand, when users report their data to servers, illegal parties can eavesdrop the data transmission processes or penetrate the servers to steal reported data. On the other hand, the communicated information between servers, which is required to train a common prediction model, can also disclose users' private data. If these disclosure risks are not properly controlled, users would refuse to contribute their data to servers even though DML may bring convenience for them.
To deal with users' privacy concerns, various privacypreserving solutions have been proposed in the literature. Differential privacy (DP) [6] is one of the privacy standards for non-cryptographical data privacy and has been applied in distributed computing scenarios [7] [8] [9] [10] . Other schemes which are not DP-preserving can be found in [11] [12] [13] . In addition, privacy-aware machine learning problems [14] [15] [16] [17] have attracted a lot of attentions, and many researchers have proposed privacy-preserving ADMM-based solutions [18] [19] [20] . However, there exists an underlying assumption in most privacy-aware schemes that the data contributors trust the server that collects their data. This trustworthy assumption may lead to privacy disclosure in many cases. For instance, when the server is penetrated by an adversary, the information obtained by the adversary may be the users' original private data.
Moreover, most existing privacy-aware schemes provide the same privacy guarantee for the entire data sample of a user though different data pieces are likely to have distinct sensitive levels. In the example of HIV-1 infection prediction [5] mentioned above, it is obvious that the label indicating HIV-1 infected or uninfected is more sensitive than other health data. Thus, the data pieces with higher sensitive levels should obtain stronger privacy protection. On the other hand, as claimed in [7] , different servers present diverse trust degrees to users due to the distinct permissions to users' data. The servers having no direct connection with a user, compared with the server collecting the user' data, may be less trustworthy. Here, the user would require that the less trustworthy servers obtain his/her information under stronger privacy preservation. Therefore, we will investigate a privacy-aware DML frame-arXiv:1908.01059v1 [cs. LG] 30 Jul 2019 work that preserves heterogeneous privacy, where users' data pieces with distinct sensitive levels can obtain different privacy guarantee against servers of diverse trust degrees.
One challenging issue is to reduce the accumulation of privacy losses over ADMM iterations as much as possible, especially for the privacy guarantee of the most sensitive data pieces. Most existing ADMM-based private DML frameworks preserves privacy by perturbing the intermediate results among servers. Since each intermediate result is computed with users' original data, its release will disclose part of private information, implying that the privacy loss increases as iterations proceed. In addition, these private DML frameworks only provide the same privacy guarantee for all data pieces. Except for intermediate information perturbation, original data randomization methods can be combined to provide heterogeneous privacy protection. However, in this case, the data used for training classifier will be perturbed version, which may directly degrade the classification performance. Thus, it is also challenging to reconcile the conflict between privacy and performance of trained classifiers.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving distributed machine learning (PDML) framework to settle these challenging issues. After removing the trustworthy servers assumption, we incorporate the users' data reporting into the model training process, which forms a two-phase training scheme together with the distributed computing process. For the privacy preservation, we adopt different approaches in the two phases. In Phase 1, a user first leverages a local randomization approach to obfuscate the most sensitive data pieces and sends the randomized version to a server. This privacy-preserving technique provides the user with self-controlled privacy guarantee for the most sensitive information. Further, in Phase 2, multiple servers collaboratively train a common prediction model and there, they use a combined noise-adding method to perturb the communicated messages, which preserves privacy for users' less sensitive data pieces. Also, such perturbation strengthens the privacy preservation of data pieces with the highest sensitive level. For the performance of the PDML framework, we analyze the generalization error of current classifiers trained by different servers.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold: 1) A two-phase PDML framework is proposed to provide heterogeneous privacy protection in DML, where users' data pieces obtain different privacy guarantees depending on their sensitive levels and servers' diverse trust degrees.
2) In Phase 1, we design a local randomization approach, which preserves DP for the users' most sensitive information. In Phase 2, a combined noise-adding method is devised to compensate the privacy protection of users' private data.
3) The convergence property of the proposed ADMM-based privacy-aware algorithm is analyzed. We also give a theoretical bound of the difference between the generalization error of trained classifiers and the ideal optimal classifier. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The related works are discussed in Section II. We provide some preliminaries and formulate the problem in Section III. Section IV illustrates the designed privacy-preserving framework, and the performance is analyzed in Section V. In order to validate the classification performance, we use multiple realworld datasets and conduct experiments in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper. A preliminary version [21] of this paper was accepted for presentation at IEEE CDC 2019. This paper contains a different privacy-preserving approach with a fully distributed ADMM setting, full proofs of the main results, and more experimental results.
II. RELATED WORKS
As one of the important applications of distributed optimization, DML has received widespread attentions from researchers. Besides the ADMM scheme, many distributed approaches have been proposed in the existing literature, e.g., subgradient descent methods [22] , local message-passing algorithms [23] , adaptive diffusion mechanisms [24] , and dual averaging approaches [25] . Compared with these approaches, ADMM schemes achieve faster empirical convergence [26] , making it more suitable for large-scale DML tasks.
For privacy-preserving problems, cryptographic techniques [27] [28] [29] are often used to protect the encrypted information not to be inferred when the key is unknown. In particular, homomorphic encryption methods [28] , [29] allow untrustworthy servers to calculate with encrypted data, and this approach has been applied in an ADMM scheme [20] . Nevertheless, such schemes unavoidably bring extra computation and communication overheads, which may not be suitable for large-scale deployment. Another commonly used approach to preserve privacy is random value perturbation [6] , [30] , [31] . DP has been increasingly acknowledged as the de facto criterion for non-encryption-based data privacy. This approach requires less costs but still provides strong privacy guarantee, though there exists a tradeoff between privacy and performance [7] .
In recent years, random value perturbation-based approaches have been widely used to address privacy protection in distributed computing, especially in consensus problem [32] . For instance, [7] [8] [9] , [11] [12] [13] provide privacy-preserving average consensus paradigms, where the mechanisms in [7] [8] [9] provide DP guarantee. Moreover, for a maximum consensus algorithm, [10] gives a differentially private mechanism. Since these solutions mainly focus on simple statistical analysis (e.g., computation of average and maximum elements), there may exist difficulties in directly applying them as privacy protection approaches for DML.
Privacy-preserving machine learning problems have also attracted the attention of many researchers recently. Under centralized learning scenarios, Chaudhuri et al. [14] proposed a DP solution for an empirical risk minimization problem by perturbing the objective function with well-designed noise. For the privacy-aware DML issue, Han et al. [33] also gave a differentially private mechanism, where the underlying distributed approach is subgradient descent. The works [15] and [17] present two dynamic DP schemes for ADMMbased DML, where the privacy guarantee is provided in each iteration. However, if a privacy violator uses the published information in all iterations to make inference, there will be no privacy guarantee. In addition, an obfuscated stochastic gradient method via correlated perturbations was proposed in [16] , though it cannot provide DP preservation. Different from these works, we remove the trustworthy servers assumption in this paper. Moreover, we take the distinct sensitive levels of data pieces and the diverse trust degrees of servers into consideration, and propose the PDML framework which provides heterogeneous privacy preservation.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first introduce the overall computation framework of DML and the ADMM algorithm used there. Then, the privacy-preserving problem in the DML framework is formulated with the definition of local differential privacy. The system overview is finally presented.
A. System Setting
We use a collaborative computing scheme similar to the one proposed by [7] . For basic statistical analysis about data collected from a large number of users, a two-phase privacy-aware computation framework is leveraged. Fig. 1 illustrates the schematic diagram of the two-phase computation framework. There are two parties involved in the whole DML process, which are users (or data contributors) and computing servers. The DML's goal is to train a classification model based on data of all users. The two phases for training the model are data collection and distributed computation, denoted by Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively. In Phase 1, each user sends his/her data to the server, which is responsible to collect all the data from the user's group. In Phase 2, each computing server utilizes a distributed computing approach to cooperatively train the classifier through information interaction with other servers.
Network Model. Consider n ≥ 2 computing servers participating in the DML and the ith server is denoted by s i . We use an undirected and connected graph G = (S, E) to describe the underlying communication topology of the n servers, where S = {s i |i = 1, 2, . . . , n} is the servers set and E ⊆ S × S is the set of communication links between servers. The number of communication links in G is assumed to be E, i.e., E = |E|. Denote the set of neighbor servers of s i as N i = {s l ∈ S : (s i , s l ) ∈ E}. The degree N i of server s i is the cardinality of N i , namely, N i = |N i |.
Different servers collect data from different groups of users, and thus all users can be divided into n distinct groups. The ith group of users, whose data is collected by server s i , is denoted by the set U i , and m i = |U i | is the number of users in U i . We assume that each user j ∈ U i has a data sample d i,j = (x i,j , y i,j ) ∈ X × Y ⊆ R d+1 , which is composed of a feature vector x i,j ∈ X ⊆ R d and the corresponding label y i,j ∈ Y ⊆ R. In this paper, we consider a binaryclassification problem. That is, there are two types of labels as y i,j ∈ {−1, 1}. It should be noted that our proposed methods can be adopted to solve multi-category classification problems through some simple modification. Suppose that all data samples d i,j , ∀i, j, are drawn from an underlying distribution P, which is unknown to servers. Here, the learning goal is that the classification model trained with limited data samples can match the ideal model trained when P is known as much as possible. Let w : X → Y be the classification model trained by the two-phase DML framework. The trained classifier w should guarantee that the accuracy of mapping any feature vector x i,j (sampled from the distribution P) to its correct label y i,j is high. We employ the method of regularized empirical risk minimization, which is a commonly used approach to find an appropriate classifier [34] . Denote the classifier trained by server s i as w i ∈ R d . The objective function (or the empirical risk) of the minimization problem is defined as
where : R × R → R is the loss function measuring the performance of the trained classifier w i . The regularizer N (w i ) is the introduced to mitigate overfitting, and a > 0 is a constant controlling the regularization effect. We assume that there exists a bounded classifier class W ⊂ R d such that w i ∈ W. For the loss function (·) and regularizer N (·), we introduce the following assumptions [14] [15] . Assumption 1. The loss function (·) is convex and doubly differentiable in w. In particular, (·), ∂ (·) ∂w and ∂ 2 (·) ∂w 2 are bounded over the class W as
where c 1 , c 2 and c 3 are positive constants. Moreover, for the second order partial derivative ∂ 2 (·) ∂w 2 , it holds ∂ 2 (y,w T x)
Assumption 2. The regularizer N (·) is doubly differentiable and strongly convex with parameter κ > 0, i.e., ∀w 1 , w 2 ∈ W,
where ∇N (·) indicates the gradient with respect to w.
We note that J({w i } i∈S ) in (1) can be separated into n different parts, where each part is the objective function of the local minimization problem to be solved by each server. The objective function of server s i is
Since w i is trained based on the data of the ith group of users, it may only partially reflect data characteristics of the users. To find a common classifier taking account of all participating users, we place a global consensus constraint in the minimization problem, as w i = w l , ∀i, l ∈ S. However, since we use a connected graph to describe the interaction between servers, a server may only receive the classifier information of neighbor servers. Hence, we have to utilize a local consensus constraint:
where z il ∈ R d is an auxiliary variable enforcing consensus between neighbor servers s i and s l . Obviously, (4) also implies global consensus. We can now write the whole regularized empirical risk minimization problem as follows [35] .
Next, for solving this problem we introduce the fully distributed ADMM algorithm from [26] . We first establish a compact form of Problem 1. Let w := [w T 1 · · · w T n ] T ∈ R nd and z ∈ R 2Ed be vectors aggregating all classifiers w i and auxiliary variables z il , respectively. To aggregate all local consensus constraints into a matrix form, we introduce two block matrices
Then, Problem 1 can be written in a compact form as:
s.t. Aw + Bz = 0.
The augmented Lagrange function associated with (7) and (8) is given by
where λ ∈ R 4Ed is the dual variable (the classifier w is the primal variable) and β ∈ R is the penalty parameter. According to [4] , Problem 1 can be solved iteratively. Particularly, at iteration t+1, the solved optimal auxiliary variable z satisfies the relation ∇L(w(t+1), z(t+1), λ(t)) = 0. Through some simple transformation, we have
Thus, we can obtain the complete dual variable λ by solving ξ. Let
Define a new dual variable
Through the simplification process in [26] , we obtain the fully distributed ADMM for solving Problem 1, which is composed of the following iterations:
Note that the new dual variable γ is also a compact vector of all local dual variables
The above ADMM iterations can be separated into n different parts, which are solved by the n different servers. At iteration t + 1, the information used by server s i to update a new primal variable w i (t+1) includes users' data d i,j , ∀j, current classifiers {w l (t)|l ∈ N i {i}} and dual variable γ i (t). The local augmented Lagrange function L i (w i , w i (t), γ i (t)) associated with the primal variable update is given by
At each iteration, server s i will update its primal variable w i (t + 1) and dual variable γ i (t + 1) as follows:
We can observe from (9) and (10) that the communicated information between computing servers is the newly updated classifiers. This information is used also for privacy inference, which will be introduced in the next subsection.
C. Privacy-preserving Problem
Private information. For users, both the feature vectors and the labels of the data samples contain their sensitive information. The private information contained in the feature vectors may be the ID, gender, general health data and so on. However, the labels may indicate, for example, whether a patient contracts a disease (e.g., HIV-1 infected or not) or whether a user has a special identity (e.g., a member of a certain group). We can see that compared with the feature vectors, the labels may be more sensitive for the users. In this paper, we consider that the labels of users' data are the most sensitive information, which should be protected with priority and obtain stronger privacy guarantee than that of feature vectors against any privacy violators.
Privacy attacks. All computing servers are viewed as untrustworthy potential privacy violators desiring to infer the sensitive information contained in users' data. In the meantime, different servers present distinct trust degrees to users. User j ∈ U i divides the potential privacy violators into two categories. The server s i , collecting user j's data directly, is the first type of privacy violator, which is given a higher trust degree. Other servers s l ∈ S, s l = s i , having no direct connection with user j, are the second type of privacy violators. Compared with server s i , other servers are less trustworthy from the viewpoint of user j. For privacy inference, the first type of privacy violators leverages user j's reported data while the second type of violators can only utilize the communicated information between servers.
Privacy protections in Phases 1 & 2. Since the label of user j's data is the most sensitive information, its original value should not be disclosed to any servers including server s i . Thus, during the data reporting process in Phase 1, user j must obfuscate the private label in his/her local device to obtain privacy protection. For the less sensitive feature vector, considering that server s i is more trustworthy, user j can choose to transmit the original version to that server. Nevertheless, the user is still unwilling to disclose the raw feature vector to servers with lower trust degrees. Hence, in this paper, when server s i interacts with other servers to find a common classifier in Phase 2, the released information about user j's data will be further processed before communication.
More specifically, in Phase 1, to obfuscate the labels, we use a local randomization approach, whose privacy-preserving property will be measured by local differential privacy (LDP) [30] . LDP is developed from differential privacy (DP), which is originally defined for trustworthy databases to publish aggregated private information [6] . The privacy preservation idea of DP is that for any two neighbor databases differing in one record (e.g., one user selects to report or not to report his data to the server) as input, a randomized mechanism is adopted to guarantee the two outputs to have high similarity so that privacy violators cannot identify the different record with high confidence. Since there does not exist any trusted server for data collection in our setting, users locally perturb their original labels through an appropriate randomization approach and report noisy versions to the servers.
For the privacy-preserving performance of local randomization methods, we define a randomized mechanism M : R d+1 → R d+1 , which takes a data sample as input and outputs a noisy version of the data sample. The definition of LDP is given as follows.
Definition 1. ( -LDP). Given the scalar > 0, a randomized mechanism M (·) preserves -LDP if for any two data samples d 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ) and d 2 = (x 2 , y 2 ) satisfying x 2 = x 1 and y 2 = −y 1 , and any observation set O ⊆ Range(M ), it holds
In (11), the parameter is called the privacy preserving degree (PPD), which describes the strength of privacy guarantee of M (·). A smaller implies stronger privacy guarantee. This is because smaller means that the two outputs M (d 1 ) and M (d 2 ) are closer, making it more difficult for privacy violators to infer the difference in d 1 and d 2 (i.e., y 1 and y 2 ).
D. System Overview
In this paper, we propose the PDML framework, where users can obtain heterogeneous privacy protection. The heterogeneity is characterized by two aspects: i) when a user faces a privacy violator, his/her data pieces with distinct sensitive levels (i.e., the feature vector and label) obtain different privacy guarantees; ii) for one type of private data piece, the privacy protection provided by the PDML is stronger against privacy violators with low trust degrees than those with higher trust degrees. Particularly, in our approach, the privacy preservation strength of users' labels is controlled by the users. Moreover, a modified ADMM algorithm is proposed to meet the heterogeneous privacy protection requirement in Phase 2.
The workflow of the proposed PDML framework is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Some details are explained below.
1) In Phase 1, a user first appropriately randomizes the private label, and then sends the noisy label and the original feature vector to a computing server. The randomization 2) In Phase 2, multiple computing servers collaboratively train a common classifier based on their collected data. A modified loss function will be utilized to mitigate the effects of randomization in Phase 1. To protect privacy of feature vectors against less trustworthy servers, we further use a combined noise-adding method to perturb the ADMM algorithm, which also strengthens the privacy guarantee of users' labels.
3) The performance of the trained classifiers is analyzed in terms of their generalization errors. We will investigate the bound of the difference between the generalization error of trained classifiers and the ideal optimal classifier. This bound should decrease as iterations proceed.
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING FRAMEWORK DESIGN
In this section, we first introduce the privacy preserving approach used in Phase 1, followed by the analysis of the privacy preservation property. Then, a modified loss function used in the ADMM iteration is proposed to mitigate the effects of randomization in Phase 1. We finally devise an ADMM perturbation scheme leveraged in Phase 2 and discuss its privacy-preserving performance.
A. Privacy-Preserving Approach in Phase 1
The objective of this subsection is to propose an appropriate approach to provide privacy preservation for the most sensitive labels. In particular, the privacy preservation is controlled by users and will not be weakened in both Phases 1 and 2. We adopt the idea of randomized response (RR) [30] to randomize users' labels. Originally, RR was used to set plausible deniability for respondents when they answer survey questions about sensitive topics (e.g., HIV-1 infected or uninfected). When using RR to obfuscate the answers, respondents only have a certain probability to answer questions according to their true situations, making the server unable to determine with certainty whether the reported answers are true. In our setting, each user randomizes the label of his/her data sample through RR and sends the noisy label to the server. This is done by a randomized mechanism defined below.
with probability p −1, with probability p yi,j, with probability 1 − 2p (12) In the above definition, p is the randomization probability controlling the level of data obfuscation. Obviously, a larger p implies higher uncertainty on the reported label, making it harder for the server to learn the true label.
Denote the output M (d i,j ) as d i,j , i.e., d i,j = M (d i,j ) = (x i,j , y i,j ). After the randomization, d i,j will be transmitted to the server. In this case, server s i can only use d i,j to train the classifier, and the released information about the true label y i,j in Phase 2 is computed based on d i,j . This implies that once d i,j is reported to the server, no more information about the true label y i,j will be released. In this paper, we set the randomization probability p in (12) as
where > 0. The following theorem gives the privacypreserving property of the randomization approach.
Proof. Let d = (x, y ) be the reported data of a user with arbitrary data sample d = (x, y) drawn from P. Then we have d = M (d). Suppose that the user's data sample has label y 1 = 1, which is denoted by d 1 = (x, 1). By (12) and (13) , the probability that the user reports label "1" to the server is
Pr
Similarly, if the user's original label is
Then, we further have the relations as follows:
With a slight abuse of the notation, we view label "−1" as "0" in the following equation. Note that under this case, the observation set O in Definition 1 is the user's reported data d . Then, for any d with feature vector x and arbitrary label y , we have
where we use the relation p ∈ (0, 1 2 ). Theorem 1 also implies that the users can tune the randomization probability according to their privacy demands. This can be seen as given randomization probability p, the PPD provided by
Obviously, a larger randomization probability leads to smaller PPD, indicating stronger privacy guarantee. If all data samples d i,j , ∀i, j, drawn from the distribution P are randomized through M , the noisy data d i,j , ∀i, j, can be considered to be obtained from a new distribution P , which is related to the PPD . Note that P is also an unknown distribution since P is unknown to computing servers.
Strengthened privacy guarantee. For users' labels, the privacy guarantee in Phase 2 is stronger than that of Phase 1. As we will further perturb the utilized ADMM algorithm, aggregated noisy data plus further message perturbation makes information about the true labels that other servers have access to more obfuscated than those obtained by server s i . Since differential privacy is immune to post-processing [6] , the PPD in (14) will not increase during the iterations of ADMM algorithm executed in Phase 2. However, such immunity is established based on a strong assumption that there is no limit to the capability of privacy violators. In our considered problem, this assumption is satisfied when all servers can have access to user j's reported data d i,j , which may not be realistic. Hence, in our problem setting, only one server (i.e., server s i ) obtains d i,j while other servers can only obtain the classifiers w i trained with users' reported data. As claimed in [7] , aggregated noisy data also implies accumulation of the randomization in each reported data sample.
B. Modified Loss Function in ADMM Algorithm
To mitigate the effect of label obfuscation executed in Phase 1, we make some modification to Problem 1. Due to the randomization in the reported labels, if we directly solve Problem 1, the obtained classifier may have a large deviation from the classifier trained with unperturbed labels. Since the available information used for modification contains only the noisy labels and the corresponding PPD , we have to adjust the loss function (·) in (5) to achieve randomization mitigation. (Note that other parts of Problem 1 are not affected by the noisy labels.) Denote the modified loss function aŝ (y i,j , w T i x i,j , ), which is given as follows:
This function has the following properties.
where c 2 is the bound of ∂ (·) ∂wi given in Assumption 1. The proof can be found in Appendix A. If server s i usesˆ (y i,j , w T i x i,j , ) in (15) as the loss function, then the objective function in (3) replaced with the one as follows:
Similar to J({w i } i∈S ) in (1), we denote the objective function with the modified loss function asĴ({w i } i∈S ) = n i=nĴ i (w i ). Then, the following lemma holds, whose proof can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. If the loss function (·) and regularizer N (·) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, respectively, thenĴ({w i } i∈S ) is aκstrongly convex.
For simplicity, we denote aκ asκ, i.e.,κ = aκ. With the objective functionĴ({w i } i∈S ), the whole optimization problem for finding a common classifier is as follows:
In Problem 2, we use the global consensus constraint to replace the local consensus constraint in (4) . This because the two constraints are equivalent, and the global consensus constraint is more convenient for the denotation of the solutions. Lemma 3. Problem 2 has an optimal solution set {ŵ i } i∈S ⊂ W such thatŵ opt =ŵ i =ŵ l , ∀i, l.
Lemma 3 can be proved directly from Lemma 1 in [35] , whose condition is satisfied by Lemma 2.
C. Privacy-Preserving Approach in Phase 2
To deal with less trustworthy servers in Phase 2, we devise a combined noise-adding approach to simultaneously preserve privacy for users' feature vectors and enhance the privacy guarantee of users' labels. We adopt the method of objective function perturbation [14] as the underlying privacy-preserving scheme for Phase 2. That is, before solving Problem 2, the servers first perturb the objective functionĴ({w i } i∈S ) with random noises. For server s i ∈ S, the perturbed objective function is given bỹ
whereĴ i (w i ) is the modified version of the objective function given in (18) , and η i ∈ R d is a bounded random noise with arbitrary distribution. Let R be the bound of noises η i , ∀i, namely, η i ≤ R. Denote the sum ofJ i (w i ) as J({w i } i∈S ) = n i=1J i (w i ). We let all servers perturb the objective using (19) , and thus the optimization problem becomes as follows:
Limitation of objective function perturbation. We remark that in our setting, objective perturbation is not sufficient to provide reliable privacy guarantee. This is because each server publishes current classifiers multiple times and each publication utilizes users' reported data. Note that in the more centralized setting of [14] , the classifier is computed by solving one round of the optimization problem. More specifically, according to (9) , w i (t + 1) is the solution to ∇L i (w i , {w l (t)} l∈Ni {i} , γ i (t)) = 0. In this case, it holds
As (10) shows, the dual variable γ i (t) can be deduced from updated classifiers. Thus, if s i 's neighbor servers have access to the updated classifier w i (t + 1) and those in the last iteration {w l (t)|l ∈ {i} N i }, then they can easily compute ∇J i (w i (t + 1)).
We should highlight that multiple releases of ∇J i (w i (t+1)) increase the risk of users' privacy disclosure. This can be explained as follows. First, note that ∇J i (w i ) = ∇Ĵ i (w i )+ 1 n η i , where ∇Ĵ i (w i ) contains users' private information. The goal of η i -perturbation is to protect ∇Ĵ i (w i ) not to be derived directly by privacy violators. However, after publishing an updated classifier w i (t + 1), server s i releases a new gradient ∇J i (·). Since the noise η i is fixed for all iterations, each release of ∇J i (·) means disclosing more information about ∇Ĵ i (·). In particular, we have ∇J i (w i (t+1))−∇J i (w i (t)) = ∇Ĵ i (w i (t + 1)) − ∇Ĵ i (w i (t)). That is, the effect of the added noise η i can be cancelled by integrating the gradients of objective functions at different time instants. This relation provides further help for privacy violators to infer ∇Ĵ i (·).
Modified ADMM by Primal variable perturbation. To ensure the objective function perturbation to provide appropriate privacy preservation in Phase 2, we adopt an extra perturbation method, which sets obstructions for other servers to obtain the gradient ∇Ĵ i (·). Specifically, after deriving classifier w i (t) by solving Problem 3, server s i first perturbs w i (t) with a Gaussian noise θ i (t) whose variance is decaying as iterations proceed, and then sends a noisy version of w i (t) to neighbor servers. We denote perturbed w i (t) asw i (t).
The local η i -perturbed augmented Lagrange function associated withJ i (w i ) is given bỹ
wherew l (t) is the perturbed classifier sent by neighbor s l . We then introduce the perturbed version of the ADMM algorithm in (9) and (10) as
where θ i (t + 1) ∼ N (0, ρ t V 2 i I d ) with decaying rate 0 < ρ < 1. At iteration t + 1, a new classifier w i (t + 1) is first obtained by solving ∇L i (w i ,w i (t), γ i (t)) = 0. Then, s i generates a Gaussian noise vector θ i (t + 1) and adds the noise vector to the solved classifier w i (t+1), thus obtainingw i (t+1). Server s i will sendw i (t + 1) out and wait for the updated classifiers from neighbor servers. At the end of an iteration, the server will update the dual variable γ i (t + 1).
Effectiveness for keeping ∇Ĵ i (·) secret. We discuss that at each iteration, s i only releases a small amount of information about ∇J i (w i (t + 1)) through the communicatedw i (t + 1). Although γ i (t) and {w l (t)|l ∈ {i} N i } are known to s i 's neighbors, ∇J i (w i (t + 1)) cannot be directly computed due to the unknown θ i (t + 1). More specifically, due to (20) , we can compute the gradient ∇J i (w i (t + 1)) as
where N i is the degree of server s i .
Using available information, privacy violators can only compute ∇J i (w i (t + 1)), namely, the gradient with respect to perturbed classifierw i (t + 1). We have
Thus, we obtain ∇Ji(wi(t + 1)) − ∇Ji(wi(t)) =∇Ĵi(wi(t + 1)) − ∇Ĵi(wi(t)) − 2βNi(θi(t + 1) − θi(t)).
We can see that ∇J i (w i (t + 1)) − ∇J i (w i (t)) is no longer the deviation between the gradients ofĴ i (·) at different time instants. Due to the added noise θ i , it would not be helpful for inferring ∇Ĵ i (·) to integrate the gradients of objective functions at different iterations. We also observe that when t → ∞, ∇J i (w i (t + 1)) can be derived since lim t→∞ η i (t + 1) = 0. Also, the relation
under η i -perturbation. Moreover, due to the local consensus constraint (4), the trained classifiers w i (t) may not have significant variation in different iterations when t → ∞. Such limited information is not sufficient for privacy violators to infer ∇Ĵ i (·) with high confidence. Actually, the gradient information within the finite-time domain plays the leading role for the inference.
Differential privacy analysis. We remark that in our privacy-preserving scheme, the noise η i added to the objective function provides underlying privacy protection in Phase 2. Even if privacy violators make inference with publishedw i in all iterations, the disclosed information is users' reported data plus extra noise perturbation. If the objective function perturbation is removed, the primal variable perturbation method cannot provide DP guarantee when t → ∞. It is proved in [15] and [17] that the w i -perturbation in (21) preserves dynamic DP. However, under their settings, users' reported information will be totally disclosed when t → ∞ since there is no other perturbation mechanisms. In their privacyaware schemes, the added noise θ i (t + 1) in each iteration provides DP preservation with a certain degree. According to the composition theorem of DP [6] , the privacy-preserving degree will increase (indicating weaker privacy guarantee) if other servers obtain the perturbed classifiersw i of multiple iterations. In particular, if the privacy violators derivew i in all iterations, the privacy-preserving degree will be ∞, implying no privacy guarantee any more. Remark 1. The objective function perturbation in (19) preserves the so-called ( p , δ p )-DP [36] . According to [14] , the perturbation in (19) preserves 2 -DP if η i has density f (η i ) = 1 ν e − 2 η i with normalizing parameter ν. Note that the noise with density f (η i ) is not bounded, which is not consistent with our setting. Although we use a bounded noise, this kind of perturbation still provides ( p , δ p )-DP guarantee, which is a relaxed form of pure p -DP.
Remark 2. The ( p , δ p )-DP guarantee is provided for users' feature vectors. Thus, in Phase 2, the sensitive information in feature vectors is not disclosed much to the servers of lower trust degrees. For the labels, they obtain extra ( p , δ p )-DP preservation in Phase 2. Since the privacy-preserving scheme in Phase 1 preserves -DP for the labels, the released information about them in Phase 2 provides stronger privacy guarantee under the joint effect of -DP in Phase 1 and ( p , δ p )-DP in Phase 2. We will investigate the joint privacypreserving degree in the future.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the classifiers trained by the proposed PDML framework. First, we establish the convergence property of the modified ADMM algorithm. Then, we use the generalization error to measure the performance of the trained classifiers, where a bound of the difference between the generalization error of trained classifiers and the ideal optimal classifier is given.
A. Convergence Property Analysis
For the perturbed objective functionJ({w i } i∈S ), we have the following lemma, showing its convexity properties. The proof can be found in Appendix C. Lemma 4 gives the guarantee that Problem 3 has an optimal solution. Similar to Lemma 3, there exists an optimal solution set {w i } i∈S ⊂ W such that wopt =wi =w l , ∀i, l.
We will use the compact form of all vectors to analyze the convergence property of the modified ADMM algorithm as
Also, letŵ := [I d · · · I d ] T ·ŵ opt ,w := [I d · · · I d ] T ·w opt and η = [η T 1 · · · η T n ] T . In order to state the results, we define an auxiliary sequence r(t) [37] as In particular, the optimal value of r(t), denoted by r opt , corresponding tow opt is the solution to the equation Qr opt + 1 2β ∇J(w opt ) = 0 [37] .
We introduce some notations to simplify the mathematical expression of the convergence results. Denote the Lipschitz continuous gradient ofJ(w) as J , namely, J = nc 3 + a .
Recall that L + and L − defined in Section III-B are the matrices related to the underlying communication topology G. Specifically, L + and L − are the extended signless and signed Laplacian matrices, respectively [26] . Both matrices are positive semi-definite (and thus Q is also positive semidefinite). We then introduce the extended degree matrix of G as W = 1 2 (L + + L − ). For a semi-definite matrix, σ max (·) and σ min (·) are used to denote its maximum and minimum nonzero singular values, respectively.
Further, we define some important parameters to be used in the next lemma. The first two parameters, b and ϕ, give a constraint to the underlying network topology G. Here, b can be arbitrarily chosen from (0, 1) while ϕ is given by ϕ = λ1−1 λ1
Also, we define M 1 and M 2 with constant λ 2 > 1 as
The following lemma gives the convergence guarantee of the modified ADMM algorithm. 
where C :=
is the convergence rate, and H 1 := w(0) −w 
Note that in (25) , C is less than 1 due to (24) , which implies the convergence property of the modified ADMM algorithm is determined by the added noise θ(k) in each iteration. Taking the expectation of w(t) −w 2 2 with respect to the added noises, we obtain
where ρ is the decaying rate of noise variance. If we choose 0 < ρ < C, then it follows
This implies that the classifiers solved by different servers will converge to the optimal solution of Problem 3 in expectation.
Remark 3. We should highlight the tradeoff between the levels of convergence guarantee and privacy protection. In our approach, we use unbounded noises to perturb the solved classifiers though the noise variance decays with iterations. This causes the perturbed ADMM algorithm to only achieve convergence in the sense of expectation. On the other hand, if bounded noises are utilized for perturbation and the noise bounds decays with iterations, then we can obtain a deterministic bound of w(t) −w 2 2 similar to (26) . In this case, the classifiers solved by all servers exponentially converge tõ w opt . However, perturbation with decaying bounded noises also provides more information for privacy violators to infer ∇Ĵ i (·), which weakens the privacy preservation in Phase 2.
B. Generalization Error Analysis
To measure the quality of trained classifiers, we use generalization error for analysis, which describes expected error of a classifier on future predictions [39] . Recall that there exists an unknown distribution P that users' data samples are drawn from. The generalization error of a classifier w is defined as the expectation of w's loss function with respect to the unknown distribution P as
Further, define the regularized generalization error given by JP (w) := GP (w) + a n N (w). (27) We assume that there exists an ideal optimal classifier w ∈ W minimizing J P (w) as w := arg min w∈W J P (w). Here, J P (w ) is the reference regularized generalization error under the classifier class W and the used loss function (·).
Since w achieves the minimum generalization error, the trained classifier can be viewed as a good predictor if it achieves generalization error close to J P (w ). Thus, we use the difference between the generalization error of trained classifiers and that of w as the performance metric of those classifiers. The difference is denoted as ∆J P (w), that is,
To measure the performance of the classifiers trained by different servers at multiple iterations, we introduce a comprehensive metric. First, considering that the classifiers w i solved by server s i at different iterations may be different until the consensus constraint (4) is satisfied, we define a classifier w i (t) to aggregate w i in the first t rounds as
where w i (k) is the obtained classifier by solving (20) . Moreover, due to the diversity of users' reported data, the classifiers solved by different servers may also differ (especially in the initial iterations). To synthetically assess the performance of classifiers trained by different servers, we compute the accumulated difference among the n servers, that is, n i=1 ∆J P (w i (t)). Theorem 2 to be stated below gives the upper bound of the accumulated difference n i=1 ∆J P (w i (t)) in the sense of expectation. In the theorem, we employ the important concept of Rademacher complexity [40] . It is defined on the classifier class W and the collected data used for training, that is, Rad i (W) = 1 mi E σj sup w∈W mi j=1 σ j w T x i,j , where σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ mi are independent random variables drawn from the Rademacher distribution, i.e., Pr(σ j = 1) = Pr(σ j = −1) = 1 2 for j = 1, 2, . . . , m i . Theorem 2. For δ ∈ (0, 1) and > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ, we have
∆JP (wi(t)) ≤ 1 2t
where
, and the parameters C, H 1 , H 2 and β are found in Lemma 5.
We then introduce a new regularized generalization error, which will be used in the proof of Theorem 2. Similar to (27) , if a classifier w is trained based on data drawn from P and loss functionˆ (y , w T x, ), then its regularized generalization error turns into J P (w) = E (x,y )∼P ˆ (y , w T x, ) + a n N (w).
According to Lemma 1,ˆ (y , w T x, ) is an unbiased estimate of (y, w T x). Thus, it is straightforward to obtain the following lemma, whose proof is omitted.
Lemma 6. For a classifier w, we have J P (w) = J P (w).
Proof of Theorem 2. First, by Lemma 6, we have
For J P (w i (t)) −Ĵ i (w i (t)) +Ĵ i (w ) − J P (w ), we have JP (wi(t)) −Ĵi(wi(t)) +Ĵi(w ) − JP (w )
According to Theorem 26.5 in [40] , with probability at least 1 − δ, we have
where Rad i (ˆ •W) is derived from Rademacher complexity of W with respect toˆ . Further, based on the contraction lemma in [40] , we obtain
where we have used Lemma 1. Also, from (15), we derive
where c 1 is the bound of the original loss function (·) (Assumption 1). Then, it follows that JP (wi(t)) −Ĵi(wi(t)) +Ĵi(w ) − JP (w )
For the remaining objective functionsJ i (·) andĴ i (·) in (29), we consider the aggregation form of all n servers. By Lemma 3, we havẽ
where we have used Jensen's inequality given the strongly convexJ(·). According to Theorem 1 in [38] , we have
Take the expectation on both sides of (32) with respect to θ(k). First, given E θ(k)
where we use E {θ(k)} = 0 and E {θ(k − 1)θ(k)} = 0. Then, it follows that
Then, for (32), we arrive at
Next, due to (23), we haveJ(w) ≤J(ŵ), which yieldŝ
By Lemma 7 in [14] , we obtain
It follows thatĴ
where R is the bound of noise η i . Substituting (33) and (34) into (31), we derive
For the remaining term η T (w −w(t)) in (29), we have
(w(k) + θ(k)) .
Taking the expectation with respect to θ(k), we obtain
By Lemma 5, we have
Then, it follows that
Substituting (30), (35) and (36) into (29) , we arrive at the bound in (28) .
C. Comparisons and Discussions
It is observed from Theorem 2 that the bound of the deviation between the generalization error of trained classifiers and that of reference classifier w decreases as iterations proceed, and the decaying rate is O 1 t . Except for the effect of limited training data, the errors introduced by the local randomization in Phase 1 and the noise perturbation in Phase 2 are contained in the final deviation, which is not 0 when t → ∞. If we use decaying bounded noises to perturb the classifiers, similar to Remark 3, the bound in (28) will not be in expectation. However, as we mentioned before, decaying bounded noises may not provide sufficient privacy preservation.
According to Lemma 5, the classifiers solved by different servers converge tow opt in the sense of expectation. The performance ofw opt can be analyzed in a similar way with Theorem 2, which is given in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For δ ∈ (0, 1) and > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ, we have ∆JP (wopt)
For the sake of comparison, we also analyze the deviation n i=1 ∆J P (w i (t)) when the privacy-preserving approach in Phase 2 is removed, and correspondingly, the bound of ∆J P (ŵ opt ) is given in the subsequent corollary.
Theorem 3. Under unperturbed ADMM algorithm, for δ ∈ (0, 1) and > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ, we have
Corollary 2. For δ ∈ (0, 1) and > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ, we have
It is observed that the bound in (38) is not in expectation since there is no noise perturbation during the ADMM iterations. It is interesting to note that the convergence rate of unperturbed ADMM algorithm is also O( 1 t ), which implies that the modified ADMM algorithm preserves the convergence speed of the general distributed ADMM scheme.
However, there exists a tradeoff between performance and privacy protection. Comparing (28) and (38) , we find that extra terms in (28) are the results of perturbations in Phase 2. Also, the effect of the objective function perturbation is reflected in (37) , that is, the term 1 nκ R 2 . When R (the bound of η i ) increases, the generalization error of the trained classifier would increase as well, indicating worse performance. Nevertheless, a larger R strengthens the privacy protection in Phase 2. Similarly, if we use noises with larger initial variances and decaying rate to perturb the solved classifiers in each iteration, the bound in (28) will also increase. Despite the performance degradation, these noises bring more obstructions for privacy violators to make inference.
Effect of data quality. We observe that the bound of ∆J P (ŵ opt ) in (39) also appears in (28) , (37) and (38) . This bound reflects the effect of users' reported data, whose labels are randomized in Phase 1. It can be seen that except for the probability δ, the bound in (39) is affected by three factors: PPD , Rademacher complexity Rad i (W), and the number of data samples m i . Here, we discuss the roles of these factors.
For the effect of PPD, we find that when is small, the bound will decrease with an increased . However, when is sufficiently large, it has limited influence on the performance of trained classifiers. That is, if users set weak privacy demands on their sensitive labels, the PPDs will not be a leading factor to affect the performance in (39) .
For comparison, we denote the optimal solution of Problem 1 as w opt , which is the final classifier when there is no privacy protection in both phases. Lemma 3 also gives the guarantee that in this case, the classifiers obtained by different servers deterministically converge to w opt . We can obtain a bound for ∆J P (w opt ) given by
Compared with the bounds in (37) and (39) , the bound of ∆J P (w opt ) is not affected by the PPD . Meanwhile, it is noticed that Rad i (W) and m i are two underlying factors affecting the performance of the trained classifiers, even without privacy protection. For the effect of Rad i (W), in both (39) and (40), we observe that the generalization errors of trained classifiers may become larger when Rad i (W) increases. The Rademacher complexity is directly related to the size of the classifier class W. If there are only a small number of candidate classifiers in W, the solved classifiers have a high probability of approaching w , which implies small deviation between their generalization errors and J P (w ). Nevertheless, we should guarantee the richness of the class W, since w trained in terms of W will have large generalization error. Though the deviation ∆J P (·) may be small, the trained classifiers are not good predictors due to the bad performance of w . Thus, setting an appropriate classifier class is important for obtaining a classifier with qualified performance.
Finally, we consider the effect of the number of users. From (40) , we know that if server i collects more data samples (larger m i ), the last term of the bound will decrease, indicating better performance of the classifier. It is known that more data samples imply access to more information about the underlying distribution P. Then, the trained classifier can predict the labels of newly sampled data from P with higher accuracy. Moreover, it can be seen from (40) that the bound is the average of n local errors generated in different servers. If there are new servers participating in the DML, these servers should guarantee that sufficient training data samples have been collected. Otherwise, the bound may not decrease though the total number of data samples increases. This is because unbalanced local errors may lead to an increase in their average, implying larger bound of ∆J P (·).
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct experiments to validate the obtained theoretical results and study the classification performance of the proposed PDML framework. Specifically, we first use a synthetic dataset to simultaneously evaluate the privacy-preserving property and the performance of trained classifiers. Then, a real-world dataset is utilized to verify the convergence property of the PDML framework and study how key parameters would affect the performance. Also, we leverage another seven datasets to verify the classification accuracy of the classifiers trained by the PDML.
A. Experiment Setup 1) Datasets: Synthetic dataset. We generate a dataset containing 1,000 data samples, where each data sample has a 3-dimensional feature vector and a label. The generated dataset is illustrated in Fig. 3(a) . A plane divides all the feature vectors into two categories, which are described by two labels. In Fig. 3(a) , the green (resp. red) dots indicate that the labels corresponding to the feature vectors are 1 (resp. −1).
Real-world datasets. We use two kinds of publicly available datasets to validate the convergence property and classification accuracy of the PDML.
(i) Adult dataset [41] . The dataset contains census data of 48,842 individuals, where there are 14 attributes (e.g., age, work-class, education, occupation and native-country) and a label indicating whether a person's annual income is over $50,000. After removing the instances with missing values, we obtain a training dataset with 45,222 samples. To preprocess the dataset, we adopt unary encoding approach to transform the categorial attributes into binary vectors, and further normalize the whole feature vector to be a vector with maximum norm of 1. The preprocessed feature vector is a 105-dimensional vector. For the labels, we mark the annual income over $50,000 as 1, otherwise it is labeled as −1.
(ii) Gunnar Raetsch's benchmark datasets [42] . There are thirteen data subsets from the UCI repository in the benchmark datasets. To mitigate the effect of data quality, we select seven datasets with the largest data sizes to conduct experiments. The seven datasets are German, Image, Ringnorm, Banana, Splice, Twonorm and Waveform, where the numbers of instances are 1,000, 2,086, 7,400, 5,300, 2,991, 7,400 and 5,000, respectively. Each dataset is partitioned into training and test data, with a ratio of approximately 70% : 30%.
2) Underlying classification approach: Logistic regression (LR) is utilized for training the prediction model, where the loss function and regularizer are LR (y i,j , w T i x i,j ) = log 1 + e −yi,j w T i xi,j and N (w i ) = 1 2 w i 2 , respectively.
Then, the local objective function is given by
It is easy to check that when the classifier class W is bounded (e.g., a bounded set W = {w ∈ R d : w ≤ W }), LR (·) satisfies Assumption 1. Due to the convexity property of N (w i ), J i (w i ) is strongly convex. Then, according to Lemma 3, Problem 2 has an optimal solution set, and thus, we can use LR to train the classifiers.
3) Network topology: We consider n = 10 computing servers collaboratively train a prediction model. A connected random graph is used to describe the communication topology of the 10 servers. The used graph has E = 13 communication links in total. Each server is responsible for collecting the data from a group of users, and thus there are 10 groups of users. Without loss of generality, in the experiments, we assume that each group has the same number of users, that is, m i = m l , ∀i, l. For example, we use m = 45, 000 instances sampled from the Adult dataset to train the classifier, and then each server collects data from m i = 4, 500 users. 
B. Experiments with Synthetic Dataset
Based on the generated synthetic dataset in Fig. 3(a) , we first validate the effectiveness of the privacy-preserving approach in Phase 1. Fig. 3(b) illustrates the data samples processed by the randomized mechanism M in (12). The PPD is chosen to be 0.4, resulting in 34.4% of the data samples with wrong labels. Note that the data with randomized labels is the information obtained by servers. When a server receives the data instance from a user, it cannot make sure whether the reported label is the true label. Further, the servers useˆ (y i,j , w T i x i,j , ) in (15) as the loss function for training and take the trained classifier to reclassify the reported data, and then obtain the results in Fig.   3(c) . It is observed that most wrong labels have been corrected (the ratio of wrong labels is 3.3%). Nevertheless, some labels are still not correct, which is unknown to the servers since they cannot obtain the original data.
Finally, we use the whole PDML framework to train a common classifier and derive the results in Fig. 3(d) . In the experiment, we use a noise with uniform distribution to perturb the objective function, and the noise bound R is set to 2.
For the Gaussian noises used for primal variable perturbation, we have initial variance V 2 i = 2 and the decaying rate ρ = 0.8. The obtained misclassification accuracy is 9.1%, which is worse than the result in Fig. 3(c) due to the effects of noise perturbations in Phase 2. However, we can still retrieve a considerable part of wrong labels though the servers do not know which user's label has been corrected. Overall, the proposed PDML preserves appropriate privacy guarantee for users while providing satisfactory classification performance.
C. Experiments with Real-world Dataset
Based on the Adult dataset, we first verify the convergence property of the PDML framework. Fig. 4(a) illustrates the maximum distances between the norms of arbitrary two classifiers found by different servers. We set the bound of η i to 1. Other settings are the same as those with experiments under the synthetic dataset. For the sake of comparison, we also draw the variation curve (with circle markers) of the maximum distance when the privacy-preserving approach in Phase 2 is removed. We observe that both distances converge to 0, implying that the consensus constraint is eventually satisfied. Fig. 4(b) shows the variation of empirical risks (the objective function in (1)) as iterations proceed. Here, the green dashed line depicts the final empirical risk achieved by general ADMM with original data, which we call the reference empirical risk. There are also two curves showing varying empirical risks with privacy preservation. Comparing the two curves, we find that the ADMM with combined noise-adding scheme preserves the convergence property of the general ADMM algorithm. Due to the noise perturbations in Phase 2, the convergence time becomes longer. In addition, it can be seen that regardless of whether the privacy-preserving approach in Phase 2 is used, both ADMM schemes cannot achieve the same final empirical risks with that of the green line, which is consistent with the analysis in Section V-C.
We then study the effects of the key parameters on the performance. In Fig. 5(a) , we examine the impact of the noise bound R when the decaying rate ρ is fixed at 0.8. It is observed that R affects the final empirical risks of the trained classifiers. The larger the noise bound, the greater the gap between the achieved final empirical risks and the reference empirical risk, which is reconciled with Corollary 1. In Fig. 5(b) , we inspect the effect of Gaussian noise decaying rate ρ when R is fixed at 1. We find that the convergence time is affected by ρ. A larger ρ implies that the communicated classifiers are still perturbed by noises with larger variance even after iterating over multiple steps. Thus, more iterations are needed to obtain the same final empirical risk with that of smaller ρ. Such a property can be derived from the bound in (28) . the PPD changes. The final empirical risks decrease with larger PPD (weaker privacy guarantee), which implies the tradeoff relation between privacy protection and the performance of the trained classifiers. Further, the extra perturbations in Phase 2 lead to larger empirical risks for all the PPDs in the experiments. We also find that when is large ( > 0.6), the achieved empirical risks are close to the reference empirical risk, and do not significantly change. Again, the result is consistent with the analysis of the bound in (39) .
D. Classification Accuracy Evaluation
classification problem, it is meaningless to obtain a precision of around 50%. The reason for the poor accuracy may be that LR is not a suitable classification approach for these two datasets. Overall, the proposed PDML framework achieves competitive classification accuracy on the basis of providing strong privacy protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a privacy-preserving ADMM-based distributed machine learning framework. By a local randomization approach, data contributors obtain selfcontrolled DP protection for the most sensitive labels and the privacy guarantee will not decrease as ADMM iterations proceed. Further, a combined noise-adding method has been designed for perturbing the ADMM algorithm, which simultaneously preserves privacy for users' feature vectors and strengthens privacy guarantee for the labels. Lastly, the performance of the proposed PDML framework has been analyzed in theory and validated by extensive experiments.
For future investigations, we will study the joint privacypreserving effect of the local randomization approach and the combined noise-adding method. Moreover, it is interesting while challenging to extend our proposed privacy-preserving framework to the non-empirical risk minimization problem. When users allocate distinct sensitive levels to different attributes, we are interested in designing a new privacypreserving scheme which can also provide heterogeneous privacy protection for the attributes.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1 (i) According to (12) , we have Pr[y i,j = y i,j |y i,j ] = 1 − p = e 1 + e , Pr[y i,j = −y i,j |y i,j ] = p = 1 1 + e , where we have used Theorem 1. Then, it follows that E y i,j ˆ (y i,j , w T i xi,j, ) = Pr[y i,j = yi,j|yi,j]ˆ (yi,j, w T i xi,j, ) + Pr[y i,j = yi,j| − yi,j]ˆ (−yi,j, w T i xi,j, ) = 1 e + 1 e ˆ (yi,j, w T i xi,j, ) +ˆ (−yi,j, w T i xi,j, ) .
By (15) , we obtain e ˆ (yi,j, w T i xi,j, ) +ˆ (−yi,j, w T i xi,j, )
= e e − 1 e (yi,j, w T i xi,j) − (−yi,j, w T i xi,j)
e (−yi,j, w T i xi,j) − (yi,j, w T i xi,j)
= (e + 1) (yi,j, w T i xi,j).
Substituting (42) into (41), we arrive at
(ii) The derivative ofˆ (y i,j , w T i x i,j , ) with respect to w i is given by This bound gives the Lipschitz constant ofˆ (y i,j , w T i x i,j , ).
B. Proof of Lemma 2
According to Assumption 2, N (·) is doubly differentiable. By Taylor's Theorem, we have N (w1) = N (w2) + ∇N (w1) T (w2 − w1)
where ∇N (·) and ∇ 2 N (·) denote the gradient and the secondorder gradient, respectively, and o w 2 − w 1 2 2 denotes the terms of order w 2 − w 1 2 2 . Due to (2), we derive (w 2 − w 1 ) T ∇ 2 N (w 1 )(w 2 − w 1 ) ≥ κ w 2 − w 1 where we have used Assumption 1. This equation also implies that f (w i ) is convex. Then, we obtain ∀w 1 , w 2 ∈ W, f (w 1 ) ≥ f (w 2 ) + ∇f (w 1 ) T (w 2 − w 1 ). It follows that Ji(w1) − aκ 2n w1 2 2 ≥Ĵi(w2) + aκ 2n w2 2 2 + ∇Ĵi(w1) T (w2 − w1) − aκ n w T 2 w1.
Rearrange the above equation so that
which indicatesĴ i (w i ) is aκ n -strongly convex. Sincê J({w i } i∈S ) = n i=1Ĵ i (w i ), it is easy to deriveĴ({w i } i∈S ) is aκ-strongly convex.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
The strongly convex property ofJ({w i } i∈S ) is proved directly from Lemma 2. For the Lipschitz continuous gradient, we consider the compact form of classifiers, as w = [w T 1 · · · w T n ] T . We haveJ(w) =J({w i } i∈S ). The second derivative ofJ(w) with respect to w is given by
Due to ∇ 2 N (·) 2 ≤ , we derive
This also gives the Lipschitz continuous gradient ofJ(w).
